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The character of South Asian constitutionalism is desribed by unstable 
constitutionalism. Unstable constitusionalism refers to a phenomenon in which all 
participants in national politics appear to be sincerely committed to the idea of 
constitusionalism – if not always a fully liberal constitutionalism, then certainly one that 
hopes to establish reasonably permanent institusions with the capacity to address issues of 
daily governance – yet they stuggle to settle on a stable institutional structure embodying a 
form of constitutionalism appropriate to their nation. The design issues are significant; a 
unitary national government, symmetrical or asymmetrical federalism, confederation, and 
more.  
The term unstable constitution aims to capture the difficulties that the law faces in 
mediating between legal norm and sociopolitical facts, as well as the pressing challenges 
involved in giving constitutionalism a character that can move a nation from civil disorder to 
stability, thereby importantly transforming persistent features of the nation’s experience. 
Although constitutional instability often takes place under conditions of ethnic conflict, 
social disorder, and profound diversity, the parties involved nonetheless are committed to 
the idea of a single state. They want to arrive at some type of constitutional contract rather 
than simply secede and not contract at all; the tensions exist because of disagreement about 
the terms of the contract.  
Constitutional instability can be revealed in several ways and can occur for various 
reasons. It may involve recurring extra-constitutional pressures on a constitutional system 
and extra-legal sites of power that challenge the system. On other occasions, institutions 
within the formal legal frame-work exercise powers in ways that begin to threaten the 
overall stability of the system. Form of instability can presist and prevent the very 
construction of an institutional framework that is process-based and substantive 
disagreements impede constitution making. 
Constitutional instability can take numerous forms. Disagreement might be so 
intense that countries find it difficult to even draft a constitution in the first place, despite 
widespread support among different political actors for establishing a constitutional 
framework. Once established, the constitutional framework might be subject to various types 
of instability. Institutions may cross their demacrated boundaries to such an extent that they 
threaten the division of labor on which the constituion rest and then attempt to usurp power 
from other institutions and relocate sovereignty. The examples are the military, institutions 
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of civil society especially religion that are protected by constitutional rights. A constitution 
also might be threatened by extra-constitusional forces, such as paramilitary or radical ethnic 
and religious groups that seek to construct an entirely different constitutional order. 
This considers five South Asian nations – Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka – in an attempt to undestand the region as a whole. These nations are dissimilar in 
important respects, and each has been subject to varying degrees of interest among 
comparative constitutional lawyers.  
Nepal  in recent years has struggled to write a constitution. The instability in Nepal’s 
constitutional order and the historical failure to arrive at a stable constitutional regime stems 
from an inability to entrech the doctrine of popular sovereignty and to secularize political 
authority. The failure of Nepal’s various constitutional arrangements to give due importance 
to the representative arm of government, reining in monarchical and executive power, and to 
respond to calls for an inclusive democratic state have been notable features in its recent 
history. Nepal has different point of emphasis, focusing on the relationships among 
constitutional instability, identity politics, and diversity. Studying how Nepal’s various 
constitutional arrangements have addressed the question of diversity and the degree of 
participation they have granted toward different groups. 
Pakistan is in many ways an ideal candidate for the study of constitutional instability. 
For much of its history, Pakistan has oscillated between military and civilian rule and has 
been a country defined by extra-constitutional pressures on its formal constitutional system. 
There are three forms of instability that threatened Pakistan’s constitutional order. The first 
form consists challenges to parliementary sovereignty by the bureaucracy and by the 
military. Second, Pakistan has witnessed claims for decentralization and provicial autonomy 
by ethno-regional forces that have sought to restructure the relationship between the 
Pakistani state and its constituent units. The third source of instability is religion, which 
manifests through attempts at shariatization of the state and the steady increase in the 
religious character of Pakistan constitutionalism.  
New democracies often have given special attention to elections; India is a notable 
example with its unique Election Commision – a body that is often credited with conducting 
uncontroversial elections in an otherwise corrup nation. Since Bangladesh’s emergence from 
military rule two decades ago, few issues have dominated its constitutional discourse as 
much as the electoral process. In 1996, the 13th Amandement to the Constitution of 1972 
introducted a system of “caretaker governments” that gave the historical and legal 
circumstances in which it arose and highlights its adverse impact on the Election 
Commission, the judiciary, and the democratic politics in Bangladesh more generally until it 
was scrapped by the 15th Amandement in 2011. The Bangladesh experience vividly 
illustrates the challenges involved in making constitutions perform in unsupportive political 
climates and the institutional damage that can occur by being insensitive to formal standards 
and conventions. Bangladesh’s political actor lack agreement on the central democratic 
exercise of politicing elections, which has been a profound source of constitutional instability 
in the country. 
This book certainly has advantages and disadvantages. First, advantages from this 
book is this book can explain and comparate how the law and poitics condition in South 
Asia. So that the reader is expected to know which countries in South Asia (India, 
Bangladesh, and Sri lanka) has a law and politics is good for their citizen. And the second is 
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disadvantages from this book. This book has a language that is difficult to understand. At 
least the reader is slightly confused by the actual intent of the contents of this book. 
